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This paper discusses the limitations of signalling by income increasing accounting methods, such as 
linear  depreciation.  Because  legislation  only  allows  the  discrete  choice  between  linear  and 
accelerated depreciation, signalling by an income increasing accounting method is only possible in 
industries where all firms perform well. The industry characteristics would not influence signalling 
by the depreciation method if legislation allowed all levels of depreciation. Moreover, successful 
fimrswould not signal their type by an income increasing accounting method but by an income 
decreasing accounting method. Finally, the contracting structure, raising the capital by issuing new 
shares  or by  the  sale  of existent shares  influences  the  tax  rate  environment needed to  solve 
asymmetries in information.  This  paper shows that the comments on the inventory signalling 
model of Hughes and Schwartz (1988) are general for all models explaining the signalling function 
by the choice of an income increasing accounting method. 2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pre- and  post-contractual  asymmetries  In information  influence  the  choice  of accounting  methods.  The 
choice of certain accounting methods creates agency costs although accounting information is  also able to 
avoid market failure and adverse selection between potential investors and the firm. By indirectly revealing 
information, such as  the choice of an auditor (Titman and Trueman,  1986; Feltham et at.  1990; Datar et at. 
1991), the replacement of an auditor (Dye,  1991), the expected cash flows (Hughes,  1986) or the inventory 
accounting method (Hughes and Schwartz, 1988), a firm tries to influence the beliefs of the investors and the 
value of the firm.  In this paper, I investigate the signalling function of the accounting depreciation method 
and I show that the comments on the inventory accounting signalling model (Hughes  and Schwartz,  1988; 
Fellingham, 1988) are general comments for all models explaining the signalling function by the choice of 
income increasing accounting methods. 
First, I discuss the influence of accounting methods on the expected bankruptcy costs. The model of Hughes 
and  Schwartz (1988)  assumes that bankruptcy costs  are  fixed and all  firms  become bankrupt at the  same 
moment. There are three reasons. why it is. better to  eliminate debt and expected bankruptcy costs from the 
signalling models by  the choice of accounting methods.  The increase in  expected bankruptcy costs is  not 
always larger for the less successful firms because empirical evidence shows that the size of bankruptcy costs 
and the market value are positively correlated (Warner,  1977; Ang et at.  1982; Altman,  1984, Weiss,  1990; 
Wruck,  1990). Moreover, the equal amount of debt for all types is a serious disadvantage of their model. If 
debt is introduced in the model,. it must be a decision variable and it can be used as  a signalling device, such 
as  in the model of Ross  (1977). In  this case, the chance is  big that signalling by  the debt level is preferred 
because it is non-dissipative. In the equilibrium the manager of the successful firm does not bear a signalling 
cost, for example an increase in expected bankruptcy costs. Finally, given the limited liability of owners not 
owners but debt holders and auditors often carry the costs of bankruptcy. I investigate whether signalling by 
the choice of accounting methods, the depreciation accounting method, is still possible when bankruptcy costs 
are eliminated. 
In  order to  answer that question  I  build  a model,  where  the  manager-owner of a  new  firm  sells  a  fixed 
percentage of the ownership to invest in a new project; this project can be successful (high cash flows) or not 3 
(low cash flows).  The owner-manager can  choose between linear and accelerated depreciation  in  order to 
influence the  beliefs  of the  investors  and  the  price received  for  the  shares. If both  types  of firms  realise 
sufficiently large cash flows accelerated depreciation results in the smallest amount of taxes paid. Therefore, 
the  manager - owner of the successful  firm  can only  signal its  type  by  choosing linear depreciation.  He 
receives a higher price for his shares sold but at the end of the project additional taxes must be paid. However, 
this  equilibrium can only occur when  the manager of the  unsuccessful firm  does  not have an  incentive to 
imitate the successful firm. Contrary to signalling by the choice of an auditor (Titman &  Trueman, 1988), the 
choice of a depreciation method does not offer additional information next to its signalling value. Therefore, 
linear depreciation results in the same increase in share price for both types at the start of the project. In this 
case, a signalling equilibrium is  only possible when linear depreciation results in a smaller increase in the 
taxes paid for the successful firm.  The characteristics of the tax rate environment necessary for achieving a 
difference in the additional taxes  paid from using linear depreciation is a concave and increasing tax  rate 
function. Moreover, the same depreciation method must be used for accounting and tax purposes. If  different 
methods could be used,  the manager-owner would use linear depreciation for accounting purposes  without 
paying extra taxes and the absence of the signalling cost would make a separating equilibrium impoBsible. In 
conclusion, if expected bankruptcy  costs  and  debt  are  eliminated,  signalling  by  the  choice of accounting 
methods remains possible but it becomes more difficult. 
In  a second part, I try to find  an explanation why the empirical evidence for the signalling function of the 
inventory  and  the  depreciation  method  is  weak  (Fellingham,  1988).  Empirical  evidence  shows  that 
unsuccessful firms typically use FIFO or linear depreciation and that prices react negatively to the switch to 
linear depreciation (Holthausen, 1981; Cheng and Coulombe, 1993). I show that the contracting structure, the 
industry characteristics and the legal environment limit signalling by the choice of accounting methods. 
First,  I investigate the effect of a changed contracting structure. If the manager-owner of a firm  raises  the 
capital by issuing new shares and he does not buy any of these new shares, his part of the cash flows realised 
drops.  This decrease depends On  the number of new shares issued and the number of new shares needed to 
raise the capital decreases as the price received goes up. Because the price offered depends on  the beliefs of 
the investors, the choice of the depreciation method influences the number of new shares issued. If  investors 4 
observe linear depreciation, they believe that they invest in a successful firm and the number of new shares 
issued is  smaller than when accelerated depreciation is  used and a lower price is  received. Therefore, if the 
current owner uses  linear depreciation the number of new shares issued is  smaller and he receives a larger 
part of the cash flows realised at the end of the project. As these cash flows are larger for the successful firm, 
the  benefit from  using  linear depreciation is  larger for  the  successful firm.  Compared to  the basic model, 
signalling by the depreciation accounting method is facilitated. Because the signalling revenue depends on the 
firm type the choice of a deprecation method can reveal the firm type also in a fixed tax rate environment. If 
the  tax  rate  is  concave  and  increasing,  signalling by  linear depreciation can  occur in  both environments. 
Because the method of raising the capital determines the possibility of signalling, not all successful firms can 
reveal their positive inside information. 
A second reason for the lack for empirical evidence is the influence of industry characteristics. If  in a certain 
industry some firms report losses, linear depreciation is the value maximizing choice for those firms. In this 
case,  the  successful  firms  will  prefer  to  hold  accelerated  depreciation  and  they  will  never  use  linear 
depreciation. If  they use linear depreciation, they pool with the unsuccessful firms and the price received for 
the shares sold decreases. Because in all industries firms reporting losses exist, I expect that in practice linear 
depreciation is only used by unsuccessful firms. 
In a last part I show that industry characteristics would not be important if legislation was less restrictive. If 
the depreciation rate could be chosen freely the successful firms would signal their type not by a lower but by 
a higher depreciation rate than the unsuccessful firm.  Because the  successful firms  signal  their type by  a 
higher  depreciation  rate  the  occurrence  of  firms  reporting  losses  does  not  eliminate  signalling  by  the 
depreciation method and industry characteristics do not influence the possibility of signalling. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic model where the assumptions, the sequence 
of the game and the equilibrium strategies for the investors and the manager-owner are described. Section 3 
outlines the limitations of the model: the influence of the contracting structure, the importance of the industry 
characteristics and the impact of legislation on the signalling function of the depreciation accounting method. 
Finally, in Section 4 some concluding remarks are made. 5 
2.  THE MODEL 
2.1  ASSUMPTIONS 
1.  There are two categories of players: the manager-owner of the firm and the investors, who compete with 
one other in the competitive market for equity 1. 
2.  Each manager-owner commits himself to start a new firm and to invest a fixed amount of K in a project 
but he does not possess all funds needed. Therefore, he sells a fraction a 1 of the ownership. 
3.  At the start of the project each manager-owner privately observes whether the project will be successful 
or  not:  H  (high  cash  flows)  or  L  (low  cash  flows).  The  distribution  of types  in  the  population  is 
commonly known: there is a probability g that the manager runs a H - firm and a probability of (I-g) that 
he manages a L - firm.  The type of the firm does not change over time. The type of the firm is q and the 
set  of feasible  types  is  T = { H, L} according  to  the  probability  function Prob,  where  Prob (H) = g, 
Prob (L) = 1 - g. 
4.  A two period model is assumed, j is the period and j E = {1,2}. In each period the firm realises u h or u I 
as  cash  flows  depending  on  the  firm  type 2.  At  time  zero  each  manager  - owner  determines  the 
depreciation method: linear (s) or accelerated depreciation (a). More generally,  dE D is the first period 
depreciation rate and  dE D =  {s, a}, where s =  112 or a  > 112. The reported earnings equal Xqdj'  where 
q E T, d E D andj E J. Hence, for example xHal =  % - aK, xHsl =  uh - Kl2, xLa2 =  uI- (l-a)K. 
5.  At the moment the manager wants to  start the project and he sells a part of his  shares, the depreciation 
method can serve as a signal towards the potential investors, where the set of feasible messages is  {s, a}. 
Given  the  observed depreciation  method and  their beliefs,  the  investors  determine  the price they  are 
willing to pay for the shares sold. The decision of the investors is not whether they should invest but only 
what price they are prepared to pay for the shares sold  3. The price, the investors are willing to offer for 
the total project, varies between a 1  V o(L,  d)  and a 1  V o(H,  d)  where d E  D  4.  The value of the project 




the value of the project, where d is the first period's depreciation rate and q is 
the firm's type; 
the level of cash flows for a q-type project; 
the risk free interest rate; 
the con~ave and. increasing tax rate for a q-type firm in a period j reporting Xqdj as 
accountmg earmngs. 
6 
6.  At the end of the project the asymmetries in information are solved and the cash flows realised are paid 
as a dividend to  the owners. The cash flows realised at the end of the first period are invested in a risk 
free asset at an interest rate i after a fixed tax rate t.  I assume that the income from risk-free investments 
is  always  taxed separately. If no  dividends are paid at the end of the first period, the manager-owner 
receives  a share (l-a  1)  of the cash flows  realised at the end of the project.  The present value of the 
income of the current owner-manager over the total life of the project equals: 
Vt(q, d):  is the project's value at time t; 
a  1:  is the part of the shares sold by the current manager-owner; 
K:  the investment amount; 
1:  the risk-free interest rate. 
Insert here Figure 1 
Figure 1: The extensive form of the game 
Figure 1 shows the sequence of the game: 
1.  Nature determines the type of the firm: a H-firm or a L-firm; 
2.  The owner-manager chooses the depreciation method: linear (s) or accelerated depreciation (ex); 
3.  Investors observe the depreciation method and in a incomplete information environment they form a 
belief pattern about the success. In an incomplete information environment, they form a belief pattern, 
whether a  successful firm  or  an  unsuccessful firm  uses  that method. If linear depreciation is  used, 
investors believe that it is  a successful firm  with a probability of r  and a unsuccessful firm  with a 
probability of (l-r). If  investors observe accelerated depreciation, they believe that it is a H-firm with a 
probability of m and an L-firm with a probability of (l-m). 
4.  The beliefs determine the price they are prepared to pay for the shares a 1  V o(H, d) or a IV o(L, d). In a 
perfect competitive market without asymmetries in  information the price always equals the  value of 
the project. Therefore, investors will never be prepared to offer a 1  V 0(H, d) for an L-firm. 7 
5.  The owner-manager sells the shares to  the highest bidder. Therefore, in a perfect competitive market 
without  asymmetries  in  information  the  offer  of a 1  V o(L,  d)  for  a  H-firm  is  never  an  equilibrium 
strategy; there are other investors, who are prepared to pay a 1  V o(R, d). 
In a complete information environment, if the cash flows are sufficiently high, both types choose accelerated 
depreciation in order to  reduce the taxes paid (see Appendix  1,  proposition 1). In this case, I identify under 
which circumstances the depreciation method can serve as a signalling device. 
2.2  EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR THE INVESTORS AND THE MANAGERS 
Proposition  1:  If law  only  allows  the  discrete  choice  between  linear  and  accelerated  depreciation, 
accelerated depreciation is the value maximizing choice for all types and the manager-owner sells a part of 
the  current shares  in  order to  raise  K,  the  manager of a  H-firm can  reveal  its  success  by  using  linear 
depreciation only in a concave and increasing tax rate environment. 
A certain strategy can only be an equilibrium when neither the managers nor the investors want to deviate 
from their chosen strategies. After observing a certain depreciation method, the investors formulate a belief 
whether  it  is  a  H-firm  or  a  L-firm  choosing  that  particular  depreciation  method.  Given  two  possible 
depreciation methods and two  types  of firms,  in a separating equilibrium two different belief patterns are 
possible: either the investors believe that accelerated depreciation is used only by  H-firms, or they believe 
that accelerated depreciation is only applied by L-firms 6. 
Only the last belief pattern can be an equilibrium strategy (m=O, r=1). If  linear depreciation is used, the firm 
is  identified as  a successful firm  and  a larger price  is  received for the  shares  sold,  alV  o(H,  s)  instead of 
a 1  V  o(L,  ex).  However, at the end of the project the cash flows realised are smaller, (l-a I)V 2(H,  ex)  is  larger 
than (l-al)V2(H, s).  The manager of the H-firm will make a trade off and he  will not have an incentive to 
deviate  when  the increase in  the  price  received  at  the  start of the  project is  larger than  the  decrease in 
discounted cash flows at the end of the project: 
(a) 
or a 1  V  o(H, s) - a 1  V o(L, ex)  ~  (I-a  l)(V o(H, ex) - V o(R, s)) 7 8 
The manager of the unsuccessful firm must realise the highest income by choosing accelerated depreciation. 
If he uses accelerated depreciation, he receives a smaller price for the shares sold, a 1 V 0  (L, ex)  instead of a 1 
V  0  (H,  s),  but at the  end of the project the cash flows  realised  are  larger,  (l-a  l)V  o(L,  ex)  instead of (1-
al)V  o(L,  s).  Again  the  manager of the  L-firm  will  make  a  trade  off and  the  belief pattern,  that  linear 
depreciation is only used by successful projects (m=O and r=I), is only reliable when: 
(b) 
or al  V  o(H, s) - al  V  o(L, ex) < (l-al)(Vo(L, ex) - V o(L, s» 
By defining a reliable belief pattern, the signalling conditions are developed. Two conclusions can be drawn. 
First, it is not surprising that the belief pattern, in which the L-firm uses linear depreciation, is not reliable. 
Using  linear  depreciation  creates  a  cost  if accelerated  depreciation  is  the  best  choice  in  an  complete 
information  setting.  Since  an  environment  of incomplete  information  is  advantageous  for  the  owner  -
manager of a L-firm, he is  never prepared to carry the cost of a deviating behaviour and thereby reveal the 
type of the firm.  This is  contrary to  the  owner of the H-firm, who receives a smaller price for the shares 
compared to a complete information environment, and who tries to reveal the type of the firm by using linear 
depreciation 8. 
Secondly, the two signalling conditions show that the revenue from linear depreciation, i.e. an increase in the 
project's value at the start of the project, a 1  (V 0(H, s) - V o(L, ex», is independent of the firm's type. The reason 
is  that, next to the information value of the signal, no  other information becomes available to the investors. 
This  is  different  from  the  auditor's  information  value  when  the  role  of the  auditor  is  not  limited  to  an 
attestation role.  A high quality auditor reveals more favourable information, when auditing a H-firm instead 
of a L-firm (Titman and Trueman, 1986). 
An absence of a difference in the signalling revenue makes a difference in the signalling cost, the additional 
taxes paid from using linear depreciation, necessary in order to reach a separating equilibrium. 9 
Insert here Figure 2 
Figure 2: The effect of using linear depreciation on the tax rate inC de )crease in both periods 
In a concave and increasing tax rate environment the additional taxes paid from using linear depreciation can 
be higher for the L-firm than the H-firm because the tax rate change from using linear depreciation is  type 
dependent. Figure 2 shows that using linear depreciation results in a larger amount of profits (xLsl > xLcx,l, 
xHsl > xHcxl)  and a tax rate increase for both types in the first period. The concave nature of the tax rate 
function is the reason why an increase in the tax rate is larger for the L-firm than the H-firm (~ tLI > ~  tHI). 
The larger increase in the tax rate can cancel out the advantage of a smaller tax base (xLsl < xHsI), and the 
extra taxes paid from using linear depreciation in the first period can be greater for the L-firm than the H-
firm. In the second period a larger amount can be written off using linear depreciation (xLs2 < xLcx2'  xHs2 < 
xHcx2) such that the tax rate decrease (~  tH2 < ~  tL2) is larger for the L-firm than the H-firm but the tax base 
is  smaller (xLs2 < xHs2).  Because the difference between the  tax rate  increase in  the first period and the 
decrease in the second period is larger for the L-firm  (~tu  - ~  tL2) than the H-firm  (~ tHI - ~  tH~ , the 
linear depreciation cost can be larger for the former. In appendix proposition 2 the difference in cost condition 
is developed given the characteristics of a concave and increasing tax rate environment. 
This analysis illustrates that expected bankruptcy costs are not necessary to explain the signalling function of 
accounting  methods.  However,  compared  to  the  model  of Hughes  and  Schwartz  (1988)  the  number  of 
separating equilibria diminishes, signalling by accounting methods is  no  longer possible in  a fixed tax rate 
environment. 
In  the  next section  I  discuss  the  limitations  of signalling  by  accounting  methods.  These  limitations  are 
illustrated for the depreciation accounting method, although these are general for all accounting methods used 
as a signalling device. 
3.  LIMITATIONS 
In the previous section I showed that linear depreciation can be a signal of a successful project. In this part I 
show that the signalling power of linear depreciation is  limited by  many factors. Because the circumstances 
determine to a large extent the signalling function of the depreciation method, empirical evidence that linear 
depreciation is mainly used by successful firms will be very difficult to find. 10 
3.1  THE CONTRACTING STRUCTURE 
In this section I investigate the effect of a different contracting structure on the signalling function of linear 
depreciation. I study the signalling problem in an environment, where the manager of an existing firm raises 
the capital by the issue of new shares. 
In  the  general model I assume that the manager of a new  firm  obtains the  needed funds  by the sale of a 
fraction a 1 of the ownership. However, situations also exist, where the manager of an existing firm raises the 
capital by the issue of new shares. The number of new shares issued is  determined by the price received for 
the shares. As the price increases, the number of new shares needed to raise K decreases and the manager's 
part  of the  final  cash flows  grows.  Given  this  method  of raising  the  capital  the  manager-owner tries  to 
maximize the liquidation value of his shares: 
K 
or  where  aq = 11 (1  +  ) 
Vo (q, d) 
Because it is  an existing firm,  the cash inflow from the issue of new shares does not belong to the current 
owners  but to  the  firm.  Therefore,  the  current owner only  receives  an  income at the  end of the project 
aq  V  2(q, d). The realised cash flows V  2 (q, d) are not influenced by the beliefs of the investors because at the 
end  of the project asymmetries in information are  already solved.  However,  the total  number of shares is 
influenced by  the beliefs  and the depreciation method used.  The manager-owner possesses  all  the current 
shares  (100  %)  but he  does  not buy  any  of the  new  shares  issued.  If the  firm  uses  linear depreciation, 
investors believe that it is a H-firm and K / V  0  (H, s) is the number of new shares needed to raise K.  In this 
case, the total number of shares equals 1 + KI V  0  (H, s). If  the firm uses accelerated depreciation, investors 
believe that it is a L-firm and more shares must be issued to raise K and the total number of shares becomes 
1  + KI V  0  (L,  ex).  In  this environment the chosen depreciation method influences the manager's part of the 
cash flows realised. 
Given complete information the manager will also use accelerated depreciation in order to minimize the taxes 
paid.  I  investigate  whether signalling  by  the  depreciation  method  is  possible  not  only  in  a  concave  and 
increasing tax rate environment but also in a fixed tax rate environment. 11 
Proposition 2: If  law only offers the discrete choice between linear and accelerated depreciation, accelerated 
depreciation is the value maximizing choice for both types and the manager-owner raises the capital by the 
issue of  new shares, the manager-owner of  a H-firm can reveal its type by using linear depreciation in a fixed 
tax rate environment. 
As  in the basic model the H-firm can only signal its  success by  using linear depreciation. In order to  know 
whether  a  separating  equilibrium,  where  the  H-firm  uses  linear  depreciation  and  the  L-firm  prefers 
accelerated  depreciation,  can  occur  I  have  to  check  whether  the  H-firm  has  an  incentive  to  use  linear 
depreciation without imitation by the L-firm.  If the H-firm uses  linear depreciation instead of accelerated 
depreciation his share of the cash flows realised increases from aL to aH. However, the cash flows realised at 
the  end of the  project decrease  because  linear depreciation  results  in additional  taxes  paid  (V  2 (H,  s)  < 
V  2 (H, a)). The H-firm is only prepared to use linear depreciation when: 
aHx V2(H,s)/(l+i)2  ~  aL  x  V2(H,a)/(I+i)2 
or  (uh (1  - t) (1/(1 +i) + 1/(1 +i)2) (aH -au 
~  aL t (aK/(1  +i) + (1  - a)K/(l  +i)2) - aH t «K/2)/(l  +i) + (K/2)/(l  +i)2)  (c) 
However, the L-firm may not have an incentive to imitate the H-firm. Or, the income increase from receiving 
a larger part of the cash flows  must be  smaller than the income decrease from an  increase in the additional 
taxes paid. 
aH  x  V2(L,s)/(I+i)2  <  aL  x  V2 (L,a)J(1+i)2 
or  (ul (1  - t)(1/(1 +i) + 1/(1 +i)2) (aH - aL) 
<  aL t (aK/(I+i) + (1  - a)K/(I+i)2) - aH t «K/2)/(l+i) + (K/2)J(l+i)2)  (d) 
In inequality (c) and (d) the right side shows the cost from using linear depreciation; as in theprevious model 
the cost is independent of the firm type in a fixed tax rate environment. The signalling revenue is shown on 
. the left-hand side and is dependent upon the type of the firm. By using linear depreciation, a larger amount of 
the final cash flows can be obtained. These cash flows are without question larger for the H-firm than for the 
L-firm. The revenue from using linear depreciation, obtaining a greater amount of the final cash flows, can be 
large enough for the successful firm  to  recuperate the income decrease from the additional taxes paid, while 12 
the L-firm can not recoup this  income decrease from the additional taxes paid. In  a concave and increasing 
tax rate environment, the additional taxes paid may even be larger for the successful than the unsuccessful 
firm and the H-firm can still reveal its type. 
This analysis clearly shows that the method of raising the needed capital influences the signalling function of 
accounting methods  and the depreciation method in  particular.  Because objective functions  differ between 
firms,  signalling  by  the depreciation  method  is  difficult  to  observe  in  practice.  Assume  a  fixed  tax  rate 
environment and two successful projects,  one owner issues  new  shares  while the  other sells a part of the 
current shares.  In this  case,  only  the first firm can reveal its type by using linear depreciation,  while both 
firms are successful. 
3.2  INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
The  signalling  function  of  the  depreciation  method  is  studied  in  an  environment,  where  accelerated 
depreciation is  the value maximizing choice for all types; all firms in the population perform relatively well. 
However,  in  almost  all  industries  firms  reporting  losses  exist.  Because  linear  depreciation  is  the  value 
maximizing  choice  for  those  firms  (see  Appendix  proposition  1),  the  successful  firms  prefer  to  use 
accelerated depreciation and they are not prepared to  signal their type by using linear depreciation. If  they 
chose linear depreciation they would be identified as a unsuccessful firm and the price received for the shares 
would be lower. 
The importance of the industry characteristics can also be illustrated by considering the possibility of entry. If 
a new entrant performs poorly, the successful firms will not continue to use linear depreciation because then 
they pool with the new unsuccessful firms. The well performing incumbent firms have an incentive to switch 
to  accelerated depreciation and to pool with the incumbent unsuccessful firms, that realise higher cash flows 
than the new entrants. However, a change from  linear to  accelerated depreciation is  mostly  not allowed by 
law. Therefore, if the manager determines the depreciation method, he will also consider the possibility and 
the success of entry. If  entry is likely to  occur and this entry is  not expected to  be successful, the successful 
incumbent firms  are not prepared to  identify their type by using linear depreciation, they prefer to pool with 
the incumbent unsuccessful firms. 13 
In conclusion, linear depreciation is not expected to be used as a signalling device because in most industries 
unsuccessful firms exist. Because legislation only allows the discrete choice between two methods and linear 
depreciation is the value maximizing choice for firms reporting losses, the successful firms can not use linear 
depreciation in order to  reveal their success. In the next section I show that signalling by the depreciation 
method would be much easier, industry characteristics would not playa part and empirical evidence would 
easier found if legislation \vas less restrictive. 
3.3  THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
In  practice  only  the  discrete  choice  between  linear  and  accelerated  depreciation  method  exists.  If the 
depreciation rate could be chosen freely, the successful firm would prefer to reveal its type not by a smaller 
but  by  a  larger  depreciation  rate  in  the  first  period  than  the  unsuccessful  firm  and  signalling  by  the 
depreciation method could become less expensive.  The influence of a continuous depreciation rate on  the 
possibility of signalling will be illustrated by the use of indifference curves (Gibbons, 1992). 
Gibbons  (1992)  illustrates  the information role of education in  the job market by  the  use of indifference 
curves. If I  want to  apply the concept to  the depreciation issue, I have to create an  employer - employee 
relationship. I assume that the manager is no longer the owner of the company, the owner sells a part of the 
shares to raise K. The manager has an incentive to reveal the firm type because his income depends on  the 
price received for the shares and it equals f + a1 V o(q, d) - K,  where f is a fixed income and a1 V 0  (q, d) - K 
is a bonus received depending on the price received for the shares. Contrary to the model of Gibbons (1992), 
the price offered for the shares sold reaches a maximum f + a 1 V  0 (q, d *) (Proof see Appendix proposition 3). 
That could be expected because a value maximizing depreciation rate d * exists for each cash flow level. At 
the end of the project the manager receives from the company a fixed income f(1 +i)2. However, in his wage 
contract  an  indemnification  for  the  current  owners  is  added  if the  manager  has  not  chosen  the  value 
maximizing depreciation rate d*.  This indemnification equals (1  - a 1) (V 2 (q,  d *)  - V 2 (q, d))/(l  +i)2 and it 
must not be paid to the new shareholders, who bought a fraction a 1 because they paid a lower price a 1  V o(q, 
d)  instead of al  V o(q,  d*). If the  value maximizing method is  used,  no  indemnification must be paid. The 
manager's income in the second period equals f/(1 +i)2 - (1  - a 1) (V 2 (q, d *) - V 2 (q, d))/(l  +i)2. 14 
Given this scenario, the owner offers the manager an income of 2f + a 1  V  0  (q, d) - K and the manager's utility 
equals 2f +  a1 V  0  (q, d) - K - (l - a1) (V2 (q, d*) - V2 (q, d))j(1+i)2. In  Figure 3, the offered wage is larger 
for the H-firm than the L-firm because the present value of the cash flows and the project's value are larger 
for the successful project (2f + a 1  V  0  (L, d) - K - (1  - a 1) (V  2 (L, d *) - V 2 (L, d))j(l  +i)2 < 2f +  a 1  V 0 (H, d) -
K - (1  - a1) (V2 (H, d*) - V2 (H, d))j(1+i)2). The indifference curves UL and UH show the demanded income 
by the manager to reach the same level of utility ( 2f +  a IV  0 (q; d) - K).  As the depreciation rate is closer to 
the value maximizing depreciation rate d *,  the indemnification paid is smaller, the offered wage is larger and 
the demanded wage to reach the same level of utility is smaller. 
Insert here Figure 3 
Figure 3: The effect of a continuous depreciation rate on the possibility of signalling by the depreciation 
rate 
In  a complete information environment the H- firm  and the  L-firm certainly choose different depreciation 
rates (dh  * for the H-firm and dl * for the L-firm). Because profits are larger for the successful firm additional 
tax  savings  can  be  realised  for  larger  depreciation  rates  (Proof see  Appendix  proposition  4).  Assume  a 
situation, where the profits of the L-firm equal zero, the L-firm does not have an incentive to  increase the 
depreciation  rate  because  profits  become  negative  and  no  additional  tax  savings  from  increasing  the 
depreciation rate can be realised. However, the profits of the H-firm are still positive, additional tax savings 
can be realised by increasing the depreciation rate and the project's value increases. 
In a situation of incomplete information the H-firm can not hold dh  *, the L-firm envies the H-firm and he can 
increase his utility by UL' if he mimics the H-firm. In order to reveal the firm type the H-firm has to increase 
the depreciation rate to dh because then the L-firm does no longer have an incentive to mimic, only the same 
utility  level can be  reached.  In  this  case,  the  H-firm does  not reveal its  type  by  a lower but by  a higher 
depreciation rate than the L-firm (dh > dh  * > dl)' 
Compared  to  linear  depreciation,  the  manager  of the  successful  firm  reaches  a  higher  level  of utility. 
Moreover, even if linear depreciation becomes the value maximizing choice for the L-firm, the H-firm can 
still  reveal  its  type.  Therefore,  industry  characteristics  influence  the  signalling outcome  because only  the 
discrete  choice  between  linear  and  accelerated  depreciation  exists.  Finally,  if  the  depreciation  rate  is 
continuous, signalling by the depreciation method could become non-dissipative. If  the performance between 15 
the  two  types  differs a lot,  the L-firm could not increase its utility  by  mimicking the H-firm. This clearly 
illustrates that legislation limits signalling by  accounting methods. If the  depreciation rate could be chosen 
freely, signalling by the depreciation method would be easier, and the results using the signalling hypothesis 
would be more convergent with other possible explanations, such as the debt covenant hypothesis. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
This paper is an extension of the inventory signalling model of Hughes and Schwartz (1988). Just like FIFO 
linear depreciation can be a signal of a successful project when a manager - owner starts a new firm and he 
raises a part of the ownership. 
Hughes and Schwartz (1988) introduce debt and fixed expected bankruptcy costs in  the model. That creates 
many problems because owners do  not carry the bankruptcy costs and these costs depend on the firm type. 
Moreover, if debt is introduced it can be used as a signalling device. I show that the introduction of expected 
bankruptcy costs is not needed to assign a positive information role to  the depreciation method. However, 
contrary to the Hughes and Schwartz paper this situation can only be reached in a concave and increasing tax 
rate  environment.  Although  I  was  able  to  eliminate  this  disadvantage,  I  show  that  the  other comments 
mentioned by  Fellingham (1988)  are  general drawbacks  of signalling models  by  the  choice of an  income 
increasing accounting method. 
First, economic circumstances such as  the method of raising the capital influence the signalling outcome. If 
an existent firm raises the capital by the issue of new shares, signalling by linear depreciation is  facilitated 
because a separating equilibrium, where the successful firm uses linear depreciation and the unsuccessful firm 
prefers  accelerated  depreciation,  can  also  be  reached  in  a  fixed  tax  rate  environment.  However,  industry 
characteristics can still make signalling by the depreciation method impossible. Accounting methods can only 
fulfil a signalling function in industries, where all firms perform relatively well. Because linear depreciation 
is  the value maximising choice for firms reporting losses, in those industries successful firms can not signal 
their  type  by  using  linear  depreciation.  They  would  be· identified  as  an  unsuccessful  firm  and  the  price 
received for the shares  sold would be smaller. Because firms  reporting losses exist in  almost all industries, 
empirical evidence is  difficult to  find.  That is  consistent with the empirical evidence found by Holthausen 16 
(1981) and Chen and Coulombe (1993) that the average abnormal return of firms  switching back to  linear 
depreciation is  negative around the announcement date. In this case, the results are also consistent with the 
debt covenant hypothesis, less successful firms use linear depreciation in order to avoid debt covenant default 
(Hagerman and Zmijewski,  1979, Zmijewski and Hagerman,  1981; Lilien et al.  , 1988). However, empirical 
evidence  also  exists,  which  confirms  our  hypothesis.  De  Angelo  et  al.(l994)  find  evidence  that  bad 
performing firms  report negative accruals  because they  renegociate contracts  with labour unions,  lenders, 
lobby  for  governance  assistance  or  have  management  changes.  Defond  and  Jiambalvo  (1994)  also  find 
evidence that firms violating debt covenants report negative abnormal accruals in the year of violation. 
The  reason  why  empirical  evidence  is  mostly  not  consistent  with  the  developed  hypothesis  is  the 
characteristics  of the  legal environment.  In  the  last part I illustrate  by  using  indifference curves  that the 
manager of the successful project would not signal its type by a lower but by a higher depreciation rate if the 
depreciation rate could be determined freely. Moreover, compared to other accounting methods signalling by 
the depreciation method is a more powerful signal because it could become non-dissipative. 
The general conclusion of this paper is that signalling by the choice of accounting methods is only possible 
under strict conditions  because compared to  other signalling devices  legislation  has  a  very  large impact. 
Because only the discrete choice between two methods (FIFO  or LIFO, linear or accelerated depreciation) 
exists,  the  choice  of an  accounting  method  is  an  expensive  signalling  device  and  it can  only  occur  in 
industries, where all firms perform well. 
APPENDIX 
Proposition 1: If  cash flows are sufficiently large,  accelerated depreciation  is the  value maximizing choice 
and linear depreciation creates a cost. 
A concave and increasing tax rate environment in x can be written as follows:  t(x  d·) - M - e - b (x  d·)  q J  - q J 
M:  the maximal tax rate; 
b:  the slope of the tax rate function; 
e:  the exponential function; 
q:  the type of the firm; 
d:  the first period depreciation rate. Using this tax rate function, accelerated depreciation can only be the value maximizing choice when the 
project's value is larger using accelerated than linear depreciation: V  0  (q,  ex) > V  0 (q, s) or 
Xqs1  (M - e -bxqs1)  - Xqex1  (M - e -bxqa1) 
(1+i) 
+ 
Xqs2 ( M - e -bxqs2)  - Xqex2 ( M - e -bxqa2) 
17 
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Because  Xqdj  (M - e-bxqdj) is a concave and increasing function of profits for values of Xqdj larger than 21b, 
accelerated depreciation is the value maximizing choice for large profit levels. If  profits are realised between 
1/b and 21b, accelerated depreciation can be the value maximizing choice only for high risk free interest rates. 
Accelerated  depreciation  can  never  be  the  value  maximizing  choice  for  profits  smaller  than  1/b.  In 
conclusion, accelerated depreciation is always the value maximizing choice for high levels of cash flows. If  a 
firm  reports  losses, profits  are  certainly  smaller than  lib and linear depreciation is  the  value maximizing 
choice. 
Proposition 2: In a concave and increasing tax rate environment a separating equilibrium is possible where 
the  H-firm  uses  linear  depreciation  and  the  L-firm  prefers  accelerated  depreciation 
because the increase in the additional taxes paid can be larger for the H-firm that the L-firm. 
From  the  signalling conditions  (a)  and  (b)  and  the  assumptions,  the  difference  in  cost condition  can  be 
derived. The successful firm faces a smaller increase in the taxes paid from using linear depreciation when: 
(M-e  -b xHs1  )  xHs1  /  (1 + i) + (M - e-b xHs2  )  xHs2  /  (1 + i)2 
(M - e -b xHa1  )  xHa1 /  (1 + i) - (M - e-b xHa2 )  xHa2 /  (1  + i)2 
(M-e  -b xLs1  )  (xLs1) /  (1  + i) + (M -e b xLs2  ) xLs2 /  (1  + i)2 
(M - e -b  xLa1  )  (xLa1) /  (1 + i) - (M - e -b  xLa2 ) xLa2 /  (1 + i)2 
The concave increasing nature of the function (M - e-bXqdj)  Xqdj for values of Xqdj larger than 2/b proves that 
the  linear depreciation cost can be higher for  the L-firm than  the H-firm  9.  In equilibrium, a situation can 
occur, where the owner-manager of the successful firm can reveal the firm type by  using linear depreciation 
without imitation by the unsuccessful firms. 18 
Proposition 3: If  the depreciation rate d is continuous, a value maximising depreciation rate d* exists. 
In order to determine the optimal d*  the first order derivative of the project's value V 0  (q, d)  to d must be 
determined. The first order derivative equals: 
lIe  -b (uq - dK) K ( b(uq-dK) - 1 ) 
MK( -- ---)  + 
(1 +i)  (l  +i)2  (l  +i) 
e -b (uq - (l-d)K) K (b(uq - (l-d)K) - 1 ) 
(1 +i)2 
Depending on the values of the exogeneously determined variables, uq, i,  K and b,  the first order derivative 
will be positive, negative or zero. The first term is always positive while the second term can be positive as 
well  as  negative. If the first order derivative equals zero,  an  optimum is  reached and the project's value is 
maximized because the second order derivative is negative. The second order derivative equals: 
e -b (uq _ dK) K ( b(uq-dK) - 2 ) 
(l  +i) 
+ 
e -b (uq _ (l-d)K) K ( b(uq - (l-d)K) - 2) 
(1 +i)2 
If  the first order derivative equals zero the sum of the exponential terms is negative because the first term of 
the  first  order derivative  is  positive.  In  this  case,  the  second  order derivative  will  certainly  be  negative 
because ( b(uq-dK) - 2 ) is smaller than ( b(uq-dK) - 1 ). 
Proposition 4: The optimal depreciation rate d* is larger for the H-firm than for the L-firm. 
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(l+i) 2 If the project's value is maximized for the H-firm, the first order derivative equals: 
or 
C2  MK  MK 
- - +-
e buh  (l+i)2  (l+i) 
o 
C  - e b uh  (  MK  _  MK) - C 1  = 0 
1  (1 +i)  (l  +i) 
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Because all terms in uh are positive, the first order derivative of V o(L, d) to d is certainly negative if it equals 
zero for the H-firm. In other words, if the project's value of the H-firm is maximized for a certain value of d 
the project's value of the L-firm is already a decreasing function of the depreciation rate. 20 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I gratefully acknowledge the comments of Prof. R. De Bondt, Prof. R. Veugelers, Prof. G. Van Herck, Prof. 
C. Van Hulle, Prof. A. Jongbloed and Prof. C. Lefebvre. The comments of the staff (especially Prof. R. Ball) 
and the participants of the doctoral colloqium of the EAA and the AAA are appreciated. 21 
REFERENCES 
J.  Ang et al.(1982). The administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy:  a note,  The  Journal of Finance,  37, 
219-26 
E.1.  Altman, (1984). The success of business failure prediction models, Journal of  Banking and Finance, 8, 
171-98 
R.  Ball and C.W. Smith (1993). The economics of  accounting policy choice, Mc Graw-Hill inc. 
S.  Bhattacharya  (1980).  Non-dissipative  signalling  structures  and  dividend  policy,  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, 94, 1-24 
P.  Cheng  and  D.  Coulombe  (1993).  Voluntary  income-increasing  accounting  changes,  Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 10,247-72 
S.  Datar et al.  (1991). The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues, Journal of  Accounting and 
Economics, 13, 3-37 
H. De Angelo et al.  (1994). Accounting choice in troubled companies, Journal of  Accounting and Economics, 
17,113-43 
M.  Defond and J.  Jiambalvo (1994). Debt covenant violation and the manipulation of accruals, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 1994, 17, 147-76 
R.  Dye (1991).  Informationally motivated auditor replacement, Journal of Accounting and Economics,  13, 
347-63 
J. Fellingham (1988). Discussion of The LIFOIFIFO Choice: an asymmetric information approach, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 1988, 10, supplement, 59-62, 
G. Feltham et al (1991). Empirical assessment of the impact of auditor quality on the valuation of new issues, 
Journal of  Accounting and Economics, 13,  375-99 
R. Gibbons (1992). Game Theory for applied economics, Princeton University Press, New Yersey 
R.  Hagerman and M. Zmijewski (1979), Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice, Journal 
of  Accounting and Economics, 1,  141-61 
P.  Healy  (1985).  The  effect  of  bonus  schemes  on  accounting  decisions,  Journal  of Accounting  and 
Economics, 7,85-107 
R.  Holthausen (1981). Theory and Evidence of the effect of bond covenants and management compensation 
contracts  on  the  choice  of accounting  techniques:  the  case  of the  depreciation  switchback,  Journal  of 
Accounting and Economics, 3,  79-109 
P.  Hughes (1986). Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information, Journal of  Accounting and 
Economics, 8,119-142 
P.  Hughes and E. Schwartz (1988). The LIFO-FIFO choice: an asymmetric information approach, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 10, supplement,  41-58 
R.  Khilstrom and M.Riordan (1984). Advertising as a signal, ,Journal of  Political Economy, 92, 427-50 
J.  Kose and J.  Williams (1985). Dividends dilution and taxes: a signalling equilibrium, Journal of  Finance, 
40,  1053-69 
S. Lilien et al.  (1988), Accounting changes: successful versus unsuccessful firms, The Accounting Review, 68, 
642-56 
N.  Melumad  and  L.  Thoman (1990).  On  auditors  and  courts  in  an  adverse  selection  setting,  Journal  of 
Accounting Research, 28 70-120 
P.  Milgrom and J.  Roberts  (1992).  Economics,  organization and  management (Engel wood Cliffs,  Prentice 
Hall) 
S. Ross (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive signalling approach, The Bell Journal 
of  Economics, 8, Spring, 23-40 
M. Spence (1973). Job market signalling, Quartely Journal of  Economics, 87,355-74 
Y.  Suh  (1990).  Communication  and  income  smoothing  through  accounting  method  choice, .Management 
Science, 36, 704-18 
S. Titman and B. Trueman (1986). Information quality and the valuation of new issues, Journal of  Accounting 
and Economics, 8, 159-72 
J.B. Warner (1977). Bankruptcy costs: some evidence, The Journal of  Finance,  1977,38  337-47 
R.  Watts  and J.  Zimmerman (1990).  Positive Accounting Theory:  a ten  years  perspective,  The  Accounting 
Review, 65  131-56 
L.A.  Weiss  (1990).  Bankruptcy  resolution:  direct  costs  and  the  violation  of priority  claims,  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27,  285-315 22 
K.H.  Wruck (1990).  Financial distress,  reorganization  and organizational efficiency, Journal of Financial 
Economics,  419-44 
M.  Zmijewski and L.  Hagerman (1981). An income strategy approach to  the positive theory of accounting 
standard setting choice, Journal of  Accounting and Economics, 3,  129-49 23 
NOTES 
1.  Melumad and Thoman (1990)  assume a similar environment, where two sets of firms need 
debt financing in a competitive debt market. 
2.  No uncertainty about the cash flows  realised is  assumed because the probability and the 
expected costs of bankruptcy are not considered. 
3.  This is very similar to the model of Spence (1973), where the employee is hired but the level 
of education determines the wage level. In the model of Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), the 
level of advertisements determines the price for the product but not the decision to buy. 
4.  Different depreciation methods cause different tax savings and the size of these tax savings 
determines  the  value  of the  firm ebcause  the  sanTe  method must be  used for  tax  a.nd 
reporting purposes. 
5.  The discount rate for the cash flows  is equal to the risk free interest rate after taxes. The 
reason is that no uncertainty about the realised cash flow level exists. 
6.  The belief that linear depreciation is  only used by the L-firm (r=O,  m=l) can never be an 
equilibrium because the manager~owner of the L  ~ firm always has an incentive to deviate. 
He does not only receive a higher income at the start of the project by using accelerated 
depreciation (a1 Vo(H, ex)  > a1 Vo(L, s»  but he also receives a larger income at the end of the 
project, (1-a1)V2(q, ex) is larger than (1-a1)V2(q, s). 
7.  Vo (q, d) = V2(q, d)/(1+i)2 because no cash flows are paid as a dividend at the end of the first 
period, they are invested in a risk-free asset at an interest rate i after a fixed tax rate t and this 
income is always taxed separately. 
8.  An unexpected accounting method can serve as a signal; this has also been proven in other 
studies. The association between FIFO and high cash flows is reliable because the use of 
LIFO is expected in a complete information environment (Hughes and Schwartz, 1988). The 
investors believe that commitments to payor payments of high dividends are only made by 
successful firms, although in a complete information setting no such commitments would be 
made (Bhattacharya,1980; Kose and Williams, 1985). And hiring a high reputable auditor 
also signals high cash flows because in a complete information setting the auditor who asks 
the lowest fee would have been chosen (Titman and Trueman, 1986). Retained ownership 
together with the choice  of  an auditor can reveal the  privat~ information although in a 
complete information situation  the firm would not hire an auditor nor would the manager, 
given his risk aversion, become a  shareholder (Datar et  al.,  1991).  In the debt market the 
choice of an auditor and the type of the audit report determine the interest rate at which the 
funds can be borrowed. In a complete information environment the risk is known by all the 
investors and no auditor would be hired (Melumad and Thoman, 1990). 
9.  A fixed tax rate for both types of firms does not lead to this needed difference. The cost from 
using linear depreciation is independent of the cash flows and it equals t(exK-K/2)(1/(1+i)-
1/(1+i)2). In an environment with that type of revenue function and a fixed tax rate, there 
must be other explanations for differences in the chosen depreciation method, one of which 
could be the existence of a management compensation scheme with a lower bound. If the 
profit level of the L-firm is  less  than this  lower bound, the manager will always prefer 
accelerated depreciation  to  increase  the  probability of  a  bonus  in the future,  while  the 
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